“Loyalty is everything”: how party centralisation erodes Bangladesh’s parliamentary independence
Bangladesh’s parliament is weakened by constitutional provisions and party control, enabling entrenched executive dominance, Professor Ali Riaz says
Sayed Hossain Shanto
The Deltagram: Would you describe executive dominance in Bangladesh as primarily a constitutional outcome (e.g., Article 70), or more a result of political party structure and practice?
Professor Ali Riaz: They are somewhat intertwined. However, I think constitutional provisions, particularly Article 70 and Article 48(3), have a significant influence. Besides, there are other ways of executive dominance. The lack of an accountability mechanism of the PM and concentration of power in the hands of the PM, as one person holds various positions (leader of the house and Chief of the party), pave the way for executive dominance. The absence of democratic practice within political parties helps perpetuate the process.
The Deltagram: Does Article 70 fundamentally reshape the nature of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh, or is it just one part of a broader system of control?
Professor Ali Riaz: Although Article 70 is the key instrument of control of parties over the MPs, it should not be seen as a stand-alone provision. The Constitution should be seen as a composite document, and there are other elements that create a broader system of control. The Standing Committees, for example, do not act as deterrents to excessive use of power and corruption. Membership of these committees are considered ‘prized postings’ for the members of the parties, particularly the ruling party. However, without making changes in Article 70, one cannot expect that MPs will dare to raise questions about the party’s position on issues.
The Deltagram: Some analysts describe Bangladesh as having “presidential-style dominance” within a parliamentary framework. Do you find that comparison analytically useful, or misleading?
Professor Ali Riaz: There has been a ‘Presidentialization’ of Westminster-style government in Bangladesh since the Constitution was adopted in 1972. It is an inherent characteristic of the present constitution. However, it became more pronounced in 1991 after the 12th Amendment of the Constitution. The amendment shifted all powers to the PM. Besides, parties under the grip of one single individual, who is also the PM, paved the way for autocratisation. Under Sheikh Hasina, it transformed into a personalistic autocracy wherein decisions were based on her whim, loyalty to her was the key to the survival and access to resources, and a kleptocratic system was built to offer largesse.
The Deltagram: To what extent does internal party centralisation contribute to limiting parliamentary independence?
Professor Ali Riaz: Undoubtedly, party centralization is highly detrimental to parliamentary independence. For Bangladesh, it is not only party centralization, but lack of democratic practices within the party and concentration of power in the hands of the party chief are pivotal in this regard.
The Deltagram: In practice, how much capacity does parliament have to influence or alter executive decisions today?
Professor Ali Riaz: In theory, parliament has the power to influence the executive’s decisions. In a parliamentary system, parliament should be holding the executive accountable. But the current Bangladesh constitution allows, and the practices of past decades show that parliament largely acts as a rubber stamp. Without major constitutional reforms, this will continue in the future.
Interview Courtesy Link: The Deltagram, Wednesday, May 13, 2026
