ON THE second anniversary of the historic July 2024 uprising, many are reminiscing of the days when the country was amid an unprecedented popular upheaval against the autocratic regime of Sheikh Hasina. The streets were turned into battlefields as a desperate regime took a last stand against its own citizens and unleashed a reign of terror to cling on to power using brutal force. The state apparatuses and regime loyalists were engaged in a killing spree. Repression, through the block raids, arrests, enforced disappearance, intimidation, and humiliation which were the hallmarks of the personalistic autocratic regime for more than a decade, reached their zenith along with the street battles which began on July 14.
People from all walks of life, on the other hand, joined the youth who spearheaded the movement. A movement demanding reform of the public service quota system transmuted into a people’s movement protesting the absence of fundamental rights and dignity. People unshackled themselves from the chains of the culture of fear that permeated society for more than a decade. Citizens were determined to forge ahead demanding the end of the autocratic rule. The death of their loved ones did not deter them; rather, it galvanised. With the death toll increasing by the hour, the number of people on the streets grew exponentially — mothers joined their children, women took the lead to challenge the forces on the street, students and workers bonded, and children and senior citizens stood shoulder to shoulder. Many of those who were injured brushed off their wounds and returned to the streets. Curfew, internet shutdown, the presence of the army on the streets, the ‘shoot-on-sight’ order, the regime’s armed goons’ unabated violence, and adverse weather made no difference, nor did the repeated threats of the autocrat, her cabinet ministers, and her political allies. The ground under the feet of the autocrat was long gone, leaving Hasina only to be told by the youth leaders that it was time for her to go. Millions took the message to heart and marched to Dhaka, and the autocrat fled on the 36th day of the glorious July. We recall the pains and sorrows, but also the bravery of the people, particularly of youth and the downtrodden who were at the forefront and laid down their lives, bearing the brunt of the state’s repression.
Notwithstanding the reminiscence, there are questions of what did the movement achieve? Has July failed? Indeed, it is imperative that we do soul searching, do stocktaking and undergo introspection. It’s quite natural to ask what was expected and what has been achieved through the uprising and since. In these conversations there are critics, sceptics, disappointed people, and deniers; but also, there are those who are pragmatists, hopeful people, and dreamers. Above all, there are people to whom the July belongs because of their personal experience and whose collective actions ensured the victory in the movement.
The assessment of the July movement and its future impacts must be prefaced with two points: what were the lessons of the July movement, and what defined it? The most important lesson of the July uprising may sound cliché but is worth mentioning — people matter. Those who are in power can underestimate the power of the people at their peril. Collective action, unified voices, and shared resistance can always overcome entrenched systems and leaders. Margaret Mead once said, ‘Never underestimate the power of a small group of committed people to change the world. In fact, it is the only thing that ever has.’ When the number swells, commitments become unwavering, and through the collective stand for common good and justice, people can achieve the most difficult goals. As we are aware, the power of the people is more than people in power. The regime, despite facing occasional criticism, largely had the backing of the external forces for business and strategic interests; India’s unequivocal support for more than a decade is well documented. These could not save the regime from the wrath of people.
While Bangladesh’s history has previously demonstrated what people can achieve when they stand up unitedly, the July uprising is distinctly different on various counts. The defining feature of the uprising was that it not only transcended the political divide of parties and the existing binaries of left-right and secularists-Islamists but also the social divide. The divisions of class, gender and ethnicity dissipated as a ‘political collective’ emerged spontaneously, and their aspirations were expressed through alternative means — in graffiti, in slogans, and in songs. Professional identities of those who died in atrocities between 16 July and 5 August serve as a testimony, revealing that working people, including rickshaw pullers, gaments workers, day labourers, and hawkers, were the most numerous victims. According to one earlier account of the 801 fatalities whose identities could be ascertained, 284 belonged to the working class and 120 were small businessmen. At least 261 students laid down their lives (Prothom Alo, 20 July 2025). As for the gender, the death toll includes at least eleven women. Besides, at a critical juncture of movement, female students at private universities played a pivotal role. Previous students’ movements tended to have little to no involvement of madrasa students, but in the July uprising they participated in droves and faced the police, BGB and regime loyalist goons, leading to the deaths of 85 madrasa students and Alems. These indicated the emergence of a new political community.
There is no doubt that the nature of the movement raised high expectations of fundamental reforms of the state. Some insist that as the movement began with a limited demand for quote reforms, associating demands with the movement for fundamental reforms is a post-facto justification. Such interpretation ignores the trajectory of the movement, particularly after 16 July, when a political collective emerged due to deprivation of fundamental rights under the regime and deep-seated structural factors which engendered a kleptocratic system and allowed the regime to remain in power without the consent of the people. It disregards the organisational structure of the movement which bore the marks of rejection of the existing political system.
Within a spontaneous popular uprising, various expectations converge. Bangladesh was no exception. For some it was a movement of regime change, while others, including students who spearheaded the movement, read the writing on the wall, literally and metaphorically. In addition to the demands laid out by the Students Against Discrimination on August 3, members of conscientious civil society, at the height of the movement, clearly articulated the demand for a constitutional assembly, a new constitution and fundamental change of governance (Prothom Alo, August 4, 2024). Unwillingness to acknowledge that citizens expected a change of the system which had become discriminatory, alienating and oppressive is deeply disturbing.
As for the post-August 5 scene, particularly during the interim government period, many of these high expectations were not met. The interim government faced daunting challenges of daily governance, fissures between the political parties, resistance to reform from within the administration, pressure from the street with many demands, and continuous machinations of the supporters of the fallen autocrat, which all created hindrances at various levels. Unfortunately, the government’s internal weaknesses and its weak responses to the emergence of various groups with sinister designs and regressive measures had serious negative impacts. The rise of mob culture, which continues nearly six months after the elected government has assumed power, will be pointed out as a marker of the post-upsurge social change. In equal measure, women’s exclusion from the policymaking sphere and the lack of recognition of their contributions to the uprising remain a disturbing development. The government’s failure to prevent attacks on two leading newspapers by radical elements undermined its record of an otherwise free media environment.
These developments should not blind us to the larger picture. Holding a peaceful election and starting the trials of those, including Hasina, who committed crimes against humanity were among the three goals of the government, with reform being the third. There have been reforms in many aspects of governance — from the banking sector to public administration to the judiciary — as the number of ordinances issued by the interim government demonstrated. Some of these are significant, and many of them have been ratified by the parliament, while some important ones have lapsed. The expectation of reform was not only bringing changes in the governance issues but also revamping the structure of the state by addressing the inadequacies of the existing constitution. This would ensure a democratic transformation of the state through establishing accountability mechanisms and independent institutions, restraining the executive branch from transgressing, preventing the concentration of power in the hands of one person, and empowering people. The July National Charter, a document that emerged through unprecedented negotiations among 30 political parties over a nine-month period, articulates these reforms. These reform measures remain to come to fruition despite an overwhelming approval of the citizens in a referendum. As time passes, this is what is making many despondent. If the structure that engendered an autocratic system prevails and the generational opportunity to bring a long-overdue restructuring of the state is squandered, will that mean the July has failed?
It will be erroneous to conclude that the July uprising has failed or succeeded to its fullest; rather we should begin with the acknowledgement that the long shadow of the July will loom large on the politics of Bangladesh for the foreseeable future. In other words, we are now in the era of a ‘long July’. The long July will continue to uphold the spirit of the movement, help introspect what went wrong, reiterate the goals yet to be fulfilled, and allow us to explore how the popular aspirations of an accountable system of governance can be built. It is also pertinent to mention that a new generation has emerged centring on the July uprising. Their identity is connected to the uprising.
The promise of July, as articulated in various recommendations in the July National Charter, resonated in the manifestos of political parties, public discourse, and demands of civil society, has one underlying principle — restoring the people’s sovereignty. The July upsurge was an exercise of sovereignty, and the referendum was another. The promise of July is a promise to establish a system that would restore human dignity, strive for social justice, ensure equality of all in the eyes of the state, and remove discrimination. These are intrinsically connected, and to think that one can pick and choose what can be implemented is disingenuous.
The awareness that the state structure warrants reforms and restructuring is no longer a matter of academic discourse or political rhetoric, it has permeated society. Citizens, in their own ways, understand what is not working for them and what needs to be done. Whether that popular awareness will be translated into a political programme is an open question, but what remains beyond doubt is that it will serve as a benchmark for years to come.
The agenda of reforms of institutions, restructuring of power and devising a new social contract between the citizens and political parties cannot be wished away. It will remain as the guide for the future.
Ali Riaz is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Illinois State University, USA and the President of the American Institute of Bangladesh. Between October 2024 and February 2026, he consecutively served as the head of the Constitution Reform Commission, vice-chair of the National Consensus Commission, and a special assistant to the chief advisor of the interim government of Bangladesh.
Courtesy: www.newagebd.net
