1.1. Introduction
The year 2025 saw several efforts at comprehensive constitutional reform. This chapter captures these efforts and draws tentative insights from three processes—in Bangladesh, Ghana, and Palestine. Each process represents a distinct context: (a) following the popular overthrow of a government (Bangladesh); (b) amid war and occupation (Palestine); and (c) a functioning electoral democracy (Ghana). The reform process in Bangladesh occurred under a technocratic interim government that sought to build institutional foundations for credible elections after almost two decades of authoritarian rule. Ghana represents a context where there is no noticeable crisis. The Palestinian process is occurring under a governing authority with only partial territorial and political control.
This chapter draws on interviews with key figures in constitutional review bodies in Bangladesh, Ghana, and Palestine. The author interviewed Professor Ali Riaz, who chaired the Bangladeshi Constitutional Reform Commission and was vice chair of the National Consensus Commission that authored the July National Charter 2025 (National Consensus Commission 2025); Professor Kwasi Prempeh, chair of the 2025 Ghanaian Constitution Review Committee; and Professor Sanaa Alsarghali, a member of the 2025 Drafting Committee for the Interim Palestinian Constitution.1
The interviews focused broadly on the fundamental issues that the respective review processes sought to address, how the relevant bodies approached the issues, the vision behind key reform proposals, the value of comparative knowledge, key insights and thoughts on next steps, and prospects for implementation.
The rest of this chapter provides background to the reform processes in each respective jurisdiction, alongside a distillation of the insights from the interviews. The chapter ends with conclusions.
1.2. Bangladesh
The Bangladesh reform process started under an interim government established following the July 2024 popular uprising that forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024) out of power just months after her party, the Awami League, claimed a landslide electoral victory. Hasina’s rule was characterized by oppression and effective capture of state institutions to advance partisan interests (Chowdhury 2025). During this period, the main opposition party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), boycotted the elections, instead demanding reforms, particularly to enable credible elections under a caretaker government.
1.2.1. Constitutional Reform Process
Led by Professor Muhammad Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, the interim government embarked on a reform drive through the establishment of six expert commissions, including a nine-member Constitutional Reform Commission (CRC), chaired by Professor Riaz. The CRC was announced in October 2024 and delivered constitutional reform proposals in January 2025. The government then established a National Consensus Commission, chaired by Professor Yunus, with Professor Riaz as a deputy chair. The consensus commission discussed proposals from all six commissions and facilitated compromise among political parties on a number of reform issues that were adopted in October 2025 as the July National Charter 2025.
The CRC consulted civil society organizations, professional groups, prominent citizens, and tens of thousands of households through a survey and online submissions. The CRC also received written submissions from political parties but left direct discussion with parties to a later stage, which occurred through the consensus commission, initially with each party. The process resulted in a shortened list of issues, which were then discussed collectively with all political parties.
Following the adoption of the charter, the interim government commenced a process to generate agreement among political parties, to be followed by implementation. The interim government adopted proposals that did not require constitutional reform ahead of elections. On constitutional issues, the charter was submitted to a referendum to decide whether the post-transition government should pursue the reforms.
Accordingly, the reform process was more open at the start through the CRC, while the second part focused mainly on ensuring (elite) political consensus, alongside targeted inputs from civil society, experts, and citizens.
1.2.2. Fundamental Issues and Key Proposals
While the CRC recognized key constitutional themes based on historical and recurrent debates, it did not start from its own sense of the issues that needed to be addressed. Instead, Professor Riaz (2026) noted a “bottom-up approach” through the consultation process to identify the problems and proposed solutions. The consultations unveiled several issues, mainly focused on the concentration of power in the executive and prime minister, credible elections, inclusivity (including of parties and gender), and capricious constitutional amendments. The aspiration was to ensure that power should entail, in the words of Professor Riaz (2026), “a mandate to govern, not a license to rule.” Despite the resurgence of religion-based political parties, tensions around values were low-key, and reform deliberations focused on the “political economy of power” (Riaz 2026).
To address the concentration of power, the CRC recommended, among other reforms, a 10-year term limit for prime ministers, a rule prohibiting individuals from serving simultaneously as prime minister and the head of a party, the establishment of an inclusive appointments council to reduce the prime minister’s appointment powers, and measures to enhance judicial independence and the autonomy of the public service. Central to ensuring the credibility of elections is the proposed reestablishment of a technocratic caretaker government to organize elections whenever needed, alongside a more autonomous Election Commission. The proposals to ensure inclusivity focused on the establishment of a second legislative chamber with proportional representation and the inclusion of women in elected and appointed bodies. To preclude instances of abusive constitutional amendments, the reforms call for approval in the proposed second chamber and, for some changes, in a referendum, in addition to current supermajority support in parliament.
Not all the reform proposals made it into the July National Charter. As the CRC realized, reform momentum and context are dynamic and public pressure can subside quickly, handing organized political parties the advantage. While most political parties recognized the need for change, smaller ones were more enthusiastic. By contrast, larger parties, including the BNP, were reluctant to simply be the vehicle for reform; they wanted reform on their own terms. Notably, the BNP, confident of its electoral victory, wanted to head to elections first, with as few constraints as possible. While there was broad agreement in support of more inclusion, notably on enhancing women's representation, the parties wanted to control how such reforms would be implemented.
Moreover, the interim government found itself busy governing alongside a bureaucracy that was not always coherent or cooperative, making the government more amenable to political parties, especially the major ones. Considering the challenges, the government adopted some reforms through ordinances, such as the establishment of an independent secretariat for the judiciary. It sought to increase the likelihood of the adoption of other reforms by ensuring broad consensus and requiring a referendum to approve the July National Charter.
1.2.3. Value of Comparative Knowledge
The CRC and the consensus commission addressed institutional issues based primarily on Bangladesh’s experience and context. Comparative practice mainly helped in framing the issues and possible solutions. Notably, once the CRC identified the fundamental issues based on consultations with stakeholders, it drew on comparative experience, including from the work of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and the collection of constitutions available through the Constitute Project. The inclusion of academics, including Professor Riaz, with comparative expertise on the CRC made it more likely that the commission would seek comparative insights. The CRC chose countries of interest depending on the specific theme, while tending to focus on neighboring countries, such as Nepal and Sri Lanka.
Professor Riaz (2026) emphasized that the CRC had no desire to emulate external systems. In addition, a deliberate attempt was made to avoid comparative experience constraining, rather than expanding, imaginations. For instance, the CRC proposed term limits for prime ministers despite the fact that such limits are unusual in parliamentary systems.
1.2.4. Insights
The reform process combined both responsiveness to public aspirations and pragmatism. Accordingly, the CRC included robust reform proposals based on public aspirations. At the same time, proposals without broad support from key parties were dropped to avoid a situation where disagreement on those issues might block consensus on others. For instance, proportional representation for parliament was popular in the pursuit of political inclusivity. Given resistance from major parties, however, the CRC proposed setting up a second chamber that would be more inclusive and limit the dominance of the first chamber, elected through the first-past-the-post system, including, notably, in relation to constitutional amendments.
Another key insight was the sequencing of deliberation, first on reform proposals (what to change) and only then on the manner of implementation (how to change). As differences regarding implementation may undermine agreement on substantive reforms, the CRC and the consensus commission delayed discussion of implementation until after the parties agreed on reform proposals. Accordingly, the July Charter did not refer to implementation.
Moreover, the reform process considered downstream constraints. Notably, considering the judicial annulment of previous constitutional amendments passed through parliament, the consensus commission proposed that the first parliament would also act as a constitutional reform assembly for 180 working days to exercise a constituent power and incorporate reforms approved through referendum.
1.2.5. What Next
In the February 2026 elections, the BNP secured over two-thirds of the seats in parliament with just under 50 percent of the vote. The July Charter received over 68 percent support, far exceeding that of the BNP.
The CRC sought to use both the bottom-up consultative process and the political consensus achieved through the consensus commission to shore up the possibilities of implementation of reforms. However, considering the supermajority needed to amend the constitution, the fate of the reforms in the July Charter lies with the BNP.
While the BNP endorsed many of the proposals in the July Charter, it registered reservations regarding certain key aspects, notably including the proposed establishment of a second legislative chamber based on proportional representation. In this context, the pursuit of reforms may depend on the leadership and political cohesiveness of the BNP and, Professor Riaz (2026) emphasized, the emergence of a coalition for reforms capable of mobilizing and sustaining public pressure.
Courtesy: www.idea.int/publications
